摘要:在STIT邏輯中,行動(dòng)者的獨(dú)立性是其群體行動(dòng)形式刻畫最基本的要求之一,但這一要求導(dǎo)致STIT邏輯對(duì)群體行動(dòng)的刻畫無法展現(xiàn)不同行動(dòng)者之間的相互影響和作用。要克服這一問題,即在STIT邏輯中將群體中不同行動(dòng)者之間的交流刻畫出來,就需要揭示行動(dòng)者獨(dú)立性這一要求的局限性,進(jìn)而結(jié)合有關(guān)集體意向的討論說明行動(dòng)者獨(dú)立性的哲學(xué)基礎(chǔ),即“主事性的承載主體只能是個(gè)體行動(dòng)者”這一設(shè)定是有問題的。糾正STIT邏輯的原有哲學(xué)基礎(chǔ)并初步給出幾個(gè)可供探索的研究方向,或可有助于STIT邏輯的群體行動(dòng)刻畫方案的改進(jìn)。
關(guān)鍵詞:STIT邏輯主事性群體行動(dòng)集體意向













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本文原載《哲學(xué)動(dòng)態(tài)》2025年第9期